



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

NOVEMBER, 1918

THE PERILS OF PEACEMAKING

"It is not," quoth an emulator of Darius Green, "the flying but the alighting that hurts."

It is not the waging of war but the making of peace that most greatly tests the wisdom and the fortitude of a nation and that subjects it to the greatest peril.

Few rational men in this country have, we believe, at any time since April, 1917, doubted the ultimate victory of the Allied Powers against the Huns, in so far as military and naval operations are concerned. Such victory has been recognized as a necessity of civilization, of humanity, and of God. The way might be long. The task might be arduous. The cost in blood and treasure might be enormous. But the end was certain. The Hun must be beaten.

Few rational men are to-day, on the other hand, free from grave apprehensions and anxiety concerning the perils of peacemaking, and the danger that the Allies may through some inept diplomacy lose much of the victory that they have won through military valor on the field of battle. It was foreseen long ago that there would be such danger. The full magnitude of it was not, however, appreciated until the President had made his extraordinary reply to the German peace drive. For in that reply he not only signified his willingness to enter into discussion and negotiation, but actually himself began such processes, and that with a Power with which he had only a few days before declared that we could not come to terms because we did not think the same thoughts nor speak the same language.

We were not unwilling, however reluctant our judgment may have been, to concede the possibility of some supernal shrewdness in the President's reply. There were those who thus regarded it, and who professed to believe that it had "put Germany in a hole." Whatever the German answer might be, they said, it would place the Kaiser's Government at a disadvantage. But the prompt reply of that Government dispelled all such delusions and revealed the trap which had been set for the President and through him for the Allies. The President was taken at his word. His implied invitation to discussion was accepted. His questions were answered. He was placed in the dilemma of being compelled either to eat his own words and thus to subject this Government to the imputation of inconsistency and insincerity, or to enter into negotiations with those with whom he had said he would not negotiate and to seek a covenanted peace with those whom he had himself declared to be without capacity for such a peace.

The fundamental principle which the President apparently overlooked is that negotiations once begun cannot easily be limited. They must be plenary, or they should not be undertaken at all. He might have replied to the German peace propaganda with the curt statement that he could and would consider no proposal but that of unconditional surrender. That would have been consistent, explicit and conclusive, and would have afforded no opening for discussion. But he did not. He asked questions; and the asking of questions is tantamount to the opening of discussion, and when you begin to discuss, Heaven knows where the end of it will be. Once having conceded the propriety of negotiations over the application of his terms of peace, he practically by implication invited Germany into an equal conference of the Powers, quite after the fashion of Metternich and Bismarck. In what a moral quagmire such proceedings might land us imagination hesitates to portray.

There were those who thought that it was a master stroke of diplomatic tactics for the President to ask whether the German Chancellor was speaking for the German Government or for the German people. But his question to that effect was addressed to the German Government. That is to say, he was seeking information and assurance from a source which he himself had declared to be untruthful and untrustworthy, so that by his own showing the answer to his ques-

tion would be valueless. Of course, if the answer had been that the Chancellor represented the Kaiser and his military entourage alone, the President might have retorted that we could not do business with them. But if the answer was, as indeed it turned out to be, that he spoke for and represented the German people, the obvious implication was that we would do business with them; for if not, why ask the question at all? Wherefore in asking that question, the answer to which was a foregone conclusion, the President was practically committing himself to negotiation with Germany.

It will not do to dispute the correctness of the German reply, on the ground that the Kaiser is still on the throne. For perhaps the German people want him there. The implication is that they do, and that he is their acceptable and appropriate representative. The President refused to recognize Huerta as President of Mexico, because he had recently put himself in office through a revolution and there was room to doubt whether the people as a whole wanted him. But when a great nation has loyally and enthusiastically supported a Chief of State for many years, and shows no signs of wishing to get rid of him, you cannot very well refuse to recognize him as their lawful and authoritative head.

The fact is that it is a most mischievous error to attempt to differentiate between the German Government and the German people. All the evidence on the subject, varied, cumulative and convincing, is that the two were in harmony in beginning the war and have continued in harmony in waging it, in both objects and methods. We know of no better witness than Dr. William Muelhon, the former director of Krupp's works at Essen, and he declares explicitly that the German people, even the Social Democrats, were as eager for the war as was the Kaiser himself; for the sake of the loot which they expected to get out of it. Nor can we differentiate between them in responsibility for atrocities. We have no doubt that orders were given from the highest sources for the practice of all manner of "frightfulness." On the other hand, there is overwhelming proof that the soldiers committed many of the most abominable outrages voluntarily, without orders; and that the German populace, civilians, women as well as men, has habitually heaped all possible insults, indignities and even assaults upon prisoners of war.

We need to take no occasion here and now to discuss in

general terms the merits of the President's rejoinder to the German reply to his note. Its rhetoric was eloquent, its sentiments were largely admirable; and its length was considerable. The advisability of its existence in any form and to any purport was contingent upon the issuance of his former note. That effected, the necessity of some later utterance was obvious. In such circumstances, perhaps the document signed by Mr. Lansing was as good as could be expected. We shall cheerfully regard it as such, provided it proves to be a finality, and the three salient points which are presented in it are never withdrawn or blunted. If they be resolutely and inexorably maintained, the dangers of peacemaking, at least those before the fact, may be avoided.

The President declares, with that unequivocal emphasis which he sometimes happily employs, that "the process of evacuation" (which Germany pretended to promise in Belgium and France) "and the conditions of an armistice" (for which Germany affected to ask) "are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments." Without dwelling upon the regret which many will inevitably feel, that he did not say that at first, instead of asking questions of the Hun, we must earnestly hope that he will now resolutely adhere to the logical and wise policy thus enunciated. It is a two-fold policy. The first part of it is that the conditions of evacuation and any possible armistice are to be prescribed and dictated by this country and its Allies, without Germany's having anything to say about them; wherefore there can be no discussion of them with Germany. It is for Germany to ask, and for us to grant if we please and when we please and how we please. And the second part is, that the prescription and dictation are to be made not by the President or any civil authority, but by the "military advisers," which must chiefly mean General Pershing and Sir Douglas Haig and Field-Marshal Ferdinand Foch, or, since he is Generalissimo, in the last analysis, Field-Marshal Foch. The point thus felicitously made by the President is, therefore, that if ever and whenever again Germany asks for an armistice, the only possible reply must be, "Ask Foch." With such disposition of such overtures from the Hun we, at any rate, shall be quite content, and shall regard it as entirely safe.

The second point made by the President might be con-

sidered as superfluous, being substantially covered in the first. Nevertheless it is of so great interest and importance that it is perhaps well to elaborate it even at the expense of repetition. It is, that the Allied Governments will never so much as consider an armistice until Germany has stopped all her violations of the laws of civilized warfare; to wit, her U-boat outrages, the burning of towns and other wanton destruction of property, and the murdering, ravishing and deportation of civilians; all of which practices she has been prosecuting with an access of savagery and feverish zeal at the very time of soliciting an armistice and peace negotiations. We could safely leave that point to Foch along with the general question of an armistice, but it was doubtless well to present it in this form, in order to put Hunnish infamy again in the pillory.

The third point is perhaps the most important of all, and is certainly the one which will be regarded with most repugnance by Germany. It is, in brief, that the Hohenzollern régime must be abolished and replaced with some government of Germany which we can trust and which will not be a standing menace to the peace of the world. The President shrewdly reminds the German Government that that was one of his formerly expressed conditions of peace, which Germany in her notes professes to accept, and that therefore Germany stands practically committed to the deposition of the Hohenzollerns or at least to the reduction of their system of Prussian militarism to impotence.

We say that this is the most important point of all, because it has to do not merely with the granting of an armistice, nor with the negotiations of peace, but with the actual granting of definitive peace and with the conditions which are to prevail thereafter. It is a condition "precedent to peace," says the President, "if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves." Those words are not to be taken in their superficial meaning, because as a matter of fact peace cannot come "by the action of the German people." There is nothing that they can do which will bring peace unless we are minded to grant it. Peace must come—it can only come—by the action of the Allies. What the President means is such action by the German people as will lead the Allies to make peace, and he indicates unmistakably that such action by Germany must include the deposition of the Hohenzollerns, or their reduction to impotence.

Let us, then, close the chapter of the President's incursion into what he himself had regarded as the forbidden field of controversy with the Hun, and retain in memory only these three vital principles which happily have emerged from it. Hereafter all requests for an armistice are to be referred to Ferdinand Foch, with plenary power, and with most comfortable assurance. And, armistice or no armistice, all overtures for peace are to be met with the inexorable demand, "Are the Hohenzollerns gone?" Those two formulas of procedure will immensely simplify the work of peacemaking, and will deprive that process of most of its perils. Of course, if the former of them is not complied with by Germany, there can be no armistice; and if the latter is not complied with, we shall simply have to persist in fighting until we ourselves have effected what the Germans will not or cannot do.

All this suggests how great an error it would be to undertake any further conference or negotiations with the Germans, whether with Kaiser or peasant. If the first tentative discussion, the very first passage of question and answer, leads to such complications as already appear, what would not be the result of going on to discuss in detail all the items of the President's "only possible programme" of peace? Indeed, the admission of any debate whatever would be self-stultifying. We have, through the President, announced the only possible terms of peace. There can, then, be no room for discussing them. It is for Germany to accept them, or to refuse them and take the consequences. But if she does accept them, and seeks a conference concerning their application? We reply that it is not for her to be consulted on the subject. We have already declared the German Government to be without honor or conscience or capacity for covenanted peace. How can we enter into conference with it? We have declared that we cannot come to terms with it. Why, then, discuss terms?

It would be not merely futile. It would be most mischievous. In such discussion we and Germany would either agree or not agree. If we did agree, that would almost certainly mean some concession or compromise on our side which ought not to be granted and the results of which would return in after years to plague us. If we did not agree, and the war was resumed, Germany would have had just so much respite, so much breathing spell, to make it just so much the harder for us finally to subdue her. Moreover, the very

fact of our pausing for a moment to think of peace and to talk of peace would cause a slackening of the war work which should be pressed and pushed to the very utmost. Nor are we to overlook the danger, at which we may be sure Germany is specially aiming, of some dissension being aroused among the Allies. We are now all agreed upon the terms of peace. But if we begin modifying or remaking those terms, what guarantee will there be of continued agreement?

But let us proceed to the extreme assumption, that negotiations were successfully conducted and that peace were secured through agreement between the Allies and the Teutonic Powers. That would be nothing but a covenanted peace, which the President assures us Germany has no capacity to make. It would be based upon a treaty to which Germany would be a party, and which Germany would regard as a mere scrap of paper the moment it suited her interest so to do. What could there be more ominous, more fraught with peril to us and to the world, than for us to enter into such a peace as that?

For the perils of peacemaking will not, let us remember, cease and vanish with the specific event. Peace is not an incident; it is a condition. It would be futile to content ourselves with merely exercising vigilance and judgment in the act of signing a treaty and then permit those faculties to lapse. Especially is such the case when, as in this instance, we are dealing with a Power which has been truthfully described as without honor or conscience or capacity for covenanted peace; of which we might say with Becket, "I never spied in thee one gleam of grace." In that characterization, whatever some sentimental lenience may imagine, we must until proof to the contrary is forthcoming include the German nation with the German dynasty. Is that too severe? It is the common rule. The confidence which our Allies repose in the United States, and which we shall require our enemies to repose in us, is not based upon the impeccable integrity of the President alone, or of his advisers, or even yet of Congress, but upon the known Constitution and characteristics of the American people; of whom even the President is merely the representative. With what measure we are thus judged, we shall insist upon measuring others. So we say that the distrust and the abhorrence with which we and the whole civilized world regard Germany is not in-

spired merely by the falsity and atrocious inhumanity of William the Damned and his sons and generals and ministers, but by the manifested disposition of that German nation of which these are either the representatives or the masters.

It matters little for the present purpose whether they are representatives or masters. If the former, if those crowned and titled criminals are the chosen and accepted exponents of the German popular will,—as indeed from all but universal expressions of loyalty and devotion and support we are quite warranted in believing,—why, there is nothing more to be said. The people are as bad as the Kaiser and must be thus treated. And indeed the presumption to that effect is so clear and strong that we shall certainly be warranted in applying to them the Continental rule of jurisprudence, the reverse of our own, to wit, that they are to be regarded as guilty until they themselves shall have proved their innocence. It is for them, for the German people, to demonstrate convincingly and satisfactorily, that they condemn the Hohenzollerns and all their works and have utterly repudiated and cast them out, before we can consent to dissociate the one from the other in criminal responsibility and in unfitness for friendly covenant.

If the latter alternative be accepted, what then? Why, if these sixty-odd million Germans, boasting themselves the wisest, strongest and most efficient people in the world, have all these years permitted themselves to be dominated and controlled against their wish and better judgment by this brigand dynasty, if they were dragooned into this war against their will, if they were made by the word of a crowned and sceptered degenerate to ravish women and murder babes and defile church altars and wantonly plunder and burn and slaughter, while all the time their pure and righteous souls revolted at the devil's work, if they have been and are such puppets in a tyrant's hand, surely it would be the crassest of folly to treat them as competent and responsible beings. They would be a race of weaklings and degenerates, fit only for leading strings until in the slow processes of evolution they should be raised to the rank of real men.

These are the considerations which imperatively require the exaction of guarantees, and something more than guarantees, of German good behavior, not merely in the specific act of peacemaking but equally in the indefinitely prolonged processes of peace-keeping, until the demands of justice have

been satisfied and the reasonable prudence of the world is made content. These are the considerations which inspire and warrant schemes for a League of Nations to Enforce Peace—to be in effect a guard against some recrudescence of Hunnish blood-lust. These are the considerations which make essential the retention of an inexorable grip upon the Hun until he shall have satisfied to the last pfennig the just demands of spoliated nations for indemnity. Let us apply the inexorable converse of the Golden Rule. We remember—Georges Clemenceau and Ferdinand Foch remember—the insistence of Germany, nearly half a century ago. France had never repudiated an obligation. She had never regarded a treaty as a scrap of paper. Her word was at par among the nations of the world. Yet Germany insisted upon keeping a garrison in the French capital until France had paid the last sou of the blood money which was extorted from her by the predatory conqueror. If it takes a hundred years for Germany to pay the indemnities which justice requires her to pay, until that time and task are utterly completed, we shall hope to see an Allied—at least a French and Belgian—garrison holding the Prussian capital at the muzzles of its guns. And until the last taint of “kultur” is eliminated, and the Blond Beast—which is the Hunnish nation—is tamed and humanized, we shall expect to see Germany compulsorily restrained from developing any military power which could be of the slightest menace to even the smallest and weakest of her neighbors.

This is not vindictiveness. It is justice tempered with forbearance. The Secretary of State was speaking eloquently the other day about justice for the German people. We are at one with him as to the desirability of justice. But we must dissent completely from those who profess to fear that our application of justice may be distorted into harshness and oppression. Let us say, very thoughtfully and with all conceivable moderation and Christian charity, that that could not be done. The most severe judgments that can be passed upon Germany will yet fall short of doing simple justice. When we remember the murder of Edith Cavell, the *Lusitania* massacre, the multitudinous ravishing of the womanhood of Belgium and France, the tortures and mutilations and butcheries, the crimes innumerable and unspeakable, the attempted destruction of whole nations,—when we remember that these things were done both by deliberate order of the

German Government and by the ready will of the German people, and that they were sanctioned and applauded by the nation, and that the foremost moral and spiritual exponents of that nation declared that he who did not sanction and applaud them was no true German,—when we remember these things, we realize that the only possible danger is not of too great severity, but of too great leniency.

The President long ago and repeatedly pointed out the course of prudence, of safety and of honor, from which if we are wise we shall not depart. It is to refuse all conferences and negotiations, until the German power is crushed. It is to make no terms, but to apply force without limit and to the utmost. And the German power must be crushed not only in a fleeting incident, but for all time. It must not only be crushed, but must be kept crushed, until in its place there has grown up a new German spirit that will not be a menace to the world. The force which is applied without stint or limit to break down to the dust the military power of Potsdam, must be a continuing force so long as it is needed to safeguard and to perpetuate the results of the war. That is the policy which we have been pursuing for months past, with superb success. It would be madness and folly and crime to abandon that policy now, at the very moment when it is attaining the ends at which it aims. Let us have no Villafranca business at the end of this war.

LEAGUE, NOT ALLIANCE

THERE is much talk of alliances and of a League of Nations; of which some is wise and some—otherwise. It arises, of course, from the practical alliance of America with a number of European and other Powers for the prosecution of the war, and from the proposal, which is made by some of the highest authorities in the land, for a league of nations after the war, to safeguard the results of victory and to maintain international peace. Both of these, the practical alliance and the proposed league, are heartily to be commended—provided that the latter is found practicable; of which some thoughtful statesmen have their doubts, and in the way of which there are undoubtedly some obstacles. But neither should be exaggerated beyond its legitimate proportions.

We could not, for example, approve the suggestion of some well-meaning but over-zealous souls, that the United States, having abandoned its "traditional policy of isolation," should now enter into conventional alliances with various Powers. For while, as we have hitherto pointed out, we have not and never have had a "policy of isolation," the same objections to such alliances as have hitherto prevailed are still valid, and indeed are actually strengthened by the circumstances and considerations of the war. We have never made a fetich of Jefferson's dictum of "entangling alliances with none," any more than Jefferson himself did when within a year of its utterance he flatly repudiated it and advocated a hard and fast offensive and defensive alliance with a European Power. But we see no reason for neglecting to discriminate, as a greater than Jefferson did, between entangling and non-entangling alliances.

There should be no objection at all to the latter kind; that is, to temporary or limited alliances, made for specific purposes, to serve those purposes and nothing more. That was what Washington had in mind when, in the same breath with which he warned the young Republic against becoming involved through fixed alliances in the affairs of Europe, specifically recommended trusting to temporary alliances for special occasions. That is precisely what we are doing at the present time. Our "alliance" with Great Britain, France and the others is not an alliance at all in the usual sense of the word, since no treaty to that effect has ever been made. But waiving that formality, and regarding it as an alliance, as it substantially is, it answers exactly to Washington's description. It is a temporary alliance, formed for the specific purpose of waging this war, and limited in its duration to the period of the war. It does not commit us to coöperation with or to responsibility for those nations in any matter beyond the war. It is therefore in no sense "entangling," but is such as would doubtless have been cordially approved by Jefferson at the very moment when he uttered that resounding phrase.

But because we have entered into this informal alliance is not the slightest reason why we should now or hereafter enter into one of the other kind, with any nation on earth. On the contrary, the very fact that this one, of limited scope and liability, is so efficient and satisfactory in its working, is a most convincing argument against the other kind. If in

the greatest crisis in our history and in the history of the world we have found this temporary quasi-alliance so eminently adequate to all our needs, why should we in less serious times assume any more binding obligations?

The history of the world, moreover, greatly disparages the value of permanent and complete alliances, either as a safeguard against war or as an aid in war. There was, we believe, an alliance between France and Russia, but it did not save Russia from something like dissolution, or from being dragged into treason at Brest-Litovsk. There was nothing but an entente between Great Britain and France, but it proved immeasurably more serviceable than the Russian alliance. The Triple Alliance did not preserve the peace of Europe, and did not, when the final test came, hold Italy to the support of the Teutonic Empires. We should not be surprised if it were found, on tallying up the matter, that alliances had on the whole caused war oftener than they had prevented it, and had resulted in vexation and enmity oftener than in satisfaction and lasting friendship.

The fact is too often ignored by advocates of alliances that such compacts are an exaltation of internationalism above nationalism. It is strange that men do not more fully appreciate this, and that while they condemn—as we believe, rightly—the international schemes of a certain type of Socialists, they approve the internationalism of high diplomacy. It is well enough to form a temporary or limited alliance for some specific purpose which both parties fully understand and approve. But it is a very different thing for one nation to tie itself fast to another with an agreement to stand by it in everything that it does and in any circumstances which may arise. That is practically to abrogate its own nationality in favor of the other's.

Yet while we should resolutely oppose an entangling alliance, we should regard with hopeful favor a League of Nations for the Maintenance of Peace. That would be because such a league, while permanent or indefinite in duration, would be limited strictly to a certain clearly defined purpose. It would pledge us to coöperation with the others in specified ways, for that specific end, and in no other way and for no other end. That would not be entangling, any more than any of a hundred treaties which we have made with one or more Powers.

On that same principle, however, we should admonish the

advocates of the League of Nations against carrying their proposals too far, so as to make it in fact a hard and fast alliance. If it is to be acceptable and is to succeed, it must be strictly limited in its purpose and methods of operation. The members must pledge themselves to the maintenance of international peace by the employment of certain means, but they must be left as absolutely free as before in all other respects. There must be no interference with their complete individual sovereignty in all domestic affairs, and indeed in all external affairs not involving war. We do not believe that it would be possible to get three important nations into such a league if, for example, it was designed to impair their freedom and independence in commercial economics. Nations will not renounce nationality for internationalism.

We are strongly inclined to think that after this war, and because of the war, there will be fewer alliances of the old-fashioned kind than there were before. People are beginning to realize that they belong to the realm of secret diplomacy and all the international abuses from Machiavelli to Metternich. Nations may make treaties, as men make contracts. But there is no more occasion for alliances than there is for cliques and cabals in social life—things which nine times out of ten are evil. A resolute maintenance of international law and justice, for small nations as well as great, and an independence of national sovereignty for every one, without secret or other alliances or any leagues save that of good citizenship in the community of nations—that is the ideal of the world after the great war.

LAST WORDS BEFORE VOTING

It is now too late to make any changes in the lists of candidates before the voters of the Republic. It is probably too late to exert any widespread influence upon the casting of the votes. Indeed, we may say that with a very few exceptions it would not be desirable to exert such influence. "Politics is adjourned." Let it remain so. Since a general election at this time is a necessary evil, let it pass with as little contention as possible. There is only one issue before the nation, and on that the two parties are substantially agreed. So far as the conduct of the war and the settlement of its issues are concerned, it will matter little whether the

new Congress contains a Republican or a Democratic majority. What will matter is, that the two parties shall continue to work together in harmonious support of the nation's policy. It is for that sake that we deprecate anything like partisan violence or animosity in these closing days of the campaign.

In scarcely one in a score of cases is there any material choice between contending candidates, or any reason why patriotic Republicans should not vote for the Republican candidate and patriotic Democrats for the Democratic candidate, and patriotic voters not affiliated with either party for either candidate that pleases them. The result will be the election of loyal men, intent upon winning the war and securing its fruits to the nation and to the world.

There are, however, two classes of local divisions, limited in number, to which we would again, at this eleventh hour, call special attention, and in which we would urge electors, regardless of party, to acquit themselves like men for the sake of the Republic. One class consists of a number of Congress Districts in various States in which third party candidates, chiefly professing a bastard Socialism, are running on pacifist or other disloyal platforms. In some such districts Republicans and Democrats have shown the sound sense and patriotism to sink rivalries and unite on the strongest candidates against the common enemy. Where this has not been done, where three candidates are in the field and there is even the two, we exhort the members of the weaker of the two loyal parties, Republican or Democrats as the case may be, to cut their own candidate and vote for the other, in order to make sure the pacifist's defeat. We cannot believe that there is a loyal voter of either party who would not rather see a loyal candidate of the other party win than see a third party pacifist elected.

The other class to which we refer consists of just two divisions, namely, the Senatorial contests in Nebraska and Michigan. Of these we have already spoken at length, but so great is their importance that we cannot refrain from adverting to them again, on the eve of election day, with all possible earnestness.

Nebraska is normally Republican, though in recent years it has occasionally departed from strict party lines, and there is ground for hoping that it may do so again this month. The Republican candidate is the present Senator, George

W. Norris. He is a man of intellectual power, professional acumen, and oratorical ability, who might in other circumstances be an honor to his State and a credit to the Senate. But existing circumstances make him all the more objectionable because of his possession of those qualities. For this man sought to excuse the *Lusitania* massacre as a mere incident of legitimate warfare; he declared that the President and Congress in declaring for war were catering to sordid greed and putting the dollar sign upon the flag. He voted against the war. He voted against the selective draft. He voted against the anti-sedition acts. He voted against essential war taxation. His conduct provoked from one of his colleagues the indignant rebuke that if it was not treason it "grazed the edge of treason."

We have not been informed that, in response to his half-plaintive, half-frantic appeals any of the important leaders of the Republican party have given him their support or countenance. We have heard no word in his behalf from either of the Republican ex-Presidents, or from the Chairman of the Republican National Committee. We know that representative and influential Republicans speak of his candidacy with regret and with resentment, as a disgrace to the party and as an insult to the nation. We have hopes, therefore, that despite the strong Republican predilections of that State, enough members of that party will vote against their unfit candidate to assure his defeat. His Democratic opponent is Mr. Morehead, a man of undoubted loyalty and patriotism, who is so well thought of in Nebraska that, though a Democrat, he was once elected Governor of that Republican State. We shall be disappointed in Nebraska if he is not now elected Senator—for the sake of the brave Nebraska boys who are fighting and suffering and dying "over there."

In Michigan it is the Democrats who are running an unfit candidate. It should not be necessary for us to expatiate upon the conspicuous unfitness of the father of Edsel Ford. Of his skill as an inventor and manufacturer there is no question. He has conferred an inestimable benefit upon the country by providing it with inexpensive motors. But those are not the essential qualifications of a Senator of the United States. If he has ever evinced even a rudimentary knowledge of or interest in public affairs, he has been singularly successful in concealing the fact. His notions of the duties and

responsibilities of ordinary citizenship are of the most hazy and chaotic description. His rank pacifism in the war has been half a joke and half a scandal. His contempt for the flag, his sordid greed in profiteering, his blatant self-advertising, his lack of even the primary principles of patriotism, make the bare suggestion of his Senatorship repulsive.

Of course in a State so overwhelmingly Republican and so staunchly loyal as Michigan, such a person running on the Democratic ticket should have not the ghost of a chance of election. Yet we must remember that he has the advantage of immense wealth and business influence; that in some utterly incomprehensible way he has secured for himself the putative cachet of Presidential favor; and that some extraordinary official efforts have been made to discredit his aggressively loyal Republican opponent. In these circumstances, while we confidently hope for Mr. Ford's defeat, we would warn the loyal voters of Michigan that it will not be safe to take chances on a single ballot; and we would earnestly advise the Democrats of that State, if they wish their organization henceforth to figure as even a respectable minority party, to cast their votes solidly for the Republican candidate. The election of Henry Ford would disgrace the State, but it would damn outright and forever the party that was his sponsor.

Citizens everywhere will do well to bear in mind that in this election they are choosing probably the most important Congress the United States has ever known. That is because it will in all probability be charged with the immeasurable responsibilities of ending the war, restoring peace, and determining the course of the nation in the tremendous tasks of world-reorganization which will follow the return of peace. Greater responsibilities, more arduous duties, never rested upon any company of men. That is why we would have the voice of faction hushed. That is why we would have, if possible, not so much as one solitary Norris or Ford in either house. That is why, at this closing hour before the polling, we commend every elector in the Republic to do his duty at the ballot box, not for the sake of his party but for the sake of the Republic and in the fear of God.

MICAWEBER: SANITARIAN

WE had supposed, or at least we had hoped, that unreadiness, indecision and delay were characteristic of this nation only in respect of the unusual circumstance of war; and that indeed in that particular the costly experience of the last few years had taught us an effectually reformatory lesson. Our boasted practicality, promptness, efficiency, and what not other business-like qualities were fondly assumed to be adequate to the needs of all ordinary emergencies. But the tragic record of the last few weeks sadly dispels those fond imaginings.

There can be no excuse nor even pretext of lack of warning of the deadly plague that scourges us. Its threatened invasion was heralded in advance. Its peculiar virulence was blazoned to the world. Every possible admonition was given, and the amplest of opportunity was afforded for us to be upon guard against it, and to exercise promptly and inexorably the most stringent measures for the suppression of every case that unfortunately made its appearance upon our shores. Those whose memory goes back a generation, to the days of occasional alarms of the possible approach of Asiatic cholera or yellow fever, and the heroic expedients then adopted for quarantining even the most slightly suspected cases, had reason to assume that at least something systematic and energetic would be done to protect this public from what was manifestly a potentially far more serious visitation.

But what was done? What has been done, save locally and even there too late? If any intelligent and comprehensive measures were taken by the general Government, they must have been concealed from public knowledge with consummate dexterity, as well as defeated in their intent by some extraordinarily malign fate. Neither principle nor power was lacking. For years the plan of a national supervision of public sanitation had been mooted, and strongly favored; and administrative machinery for that purpose had been constructed. Seeing, moreover, the practically unlimited dictatorship with which the Chief Executive had been invested for the purpose of prosecuting the war, and seeing the disastrous effect which an epidemic, striking most of all at the camps, would certainly have upon our military activities, the Administration must certainly have been accounted

competent to take almost any action that seemed desirable in the premises. It could have issued imperative orders, as it has done for "lightless nights" and what not, which the people would have been compelled to obey. It could have made an earnest request, as it did for "gasless Sundays," to which the people would have responded with ungrudging loyalty. Or, in the last resort, if for any reason the President had imagined himself without legislative authority for such action, an appeal to Congress, such as he has repeatedly made, sometimes for much less important causes, would have assured him the amplest sanction within a few hours.

But no order was issued. No request was made of the public. No authority was sought from Congress. So far as any outward indication was vouchsafed, the Administration might never have heard that such things as influenza and pneumonia existed. An impassioned appeal was made for the passage of a woman suffrage resolution as a vital necessity for the prosecution of the war; as though Pershing's army would be paralyzed and Foch's strategy would be baffled and the U-boats would rage unhindered and triumphant, unless immediate steps were taken to grant votes to women at some date subsequent to the probable ending of the war. But there was not a word about stamping out a plague which was claiming many more victims than all the fighting on the Western Front, and that was disabling men in our camps and cantonments more rapidly than we were sending men abroad.

It is impossible to doubt that if the President had ordered, as he might have done, or had simply requested, or even suggested, the universal closing of all theatres, moving picture houses, and other places of unnecessary assemblage, the nation would have responded instantly, cordially, and gratefully. It is impossible to doubt, either, that such action, maintained, let us say, for a week, or a fortnight, would have been powerfully efficient in preventing the spread of the epidemic and in thus aiding physicians and sanitarians to dispose of the cases which had already occurred and thus bring the plague to an end. And that, of course, would have been only one of the measures which might have been taken, and perhaps not the most important of them.

In thus doing nothing itself, the general Government set a bad example which States and municipalities too largely followed, until the epidemic had gained a headway too great

to be summarily checked. The New England States, and especially Massachusetts, were first scourged; but their woe was little warning to the others. Only when the pestilence attained appalling proportions was belated action taken. In mid-October a prominent and judicious physician of Philadelphia wrote to a friend in New York:

Here it is perfectly dreadful, and I think it must be far worse than in New York. Many bodies are lying unburied because neither graves nor undertakers are available. One Jewish rabbi had to cart his own son to the cemetery and bury him himself. There are in the *Ledger* a page and a half and sometimes more of solid notices of deaths. All of our theatres, churches, movies, and public gatherings of all kinds are stopped. I am surprised to see that such public gatherings are still open in New York.

If there was any error at all in this, it was in the assumption that Philadelphia was suffering more severely than New York. For at that very time the death rate in New York was higher than it had ever been known in the history of the city since vital statistics were recorded; deaths from the pestilence numbered between six hundred and seven hundred daily, and reported cases ten times as many, while physicians and sanitary experts of the highest standing declared that the actual number of cases was several times that officially reported. Yet not a theatre nor a moving picture place was closed, nor other unnecessary assemblage prohibited. So far as the public could perceive or discover, the health authorities gave their chief attention to speculating upon the probable time when the epidemic would "reach its peak" and begin to decline. It was a case of "waiting for something to turn up" while thousands died and hundreds of thousands fell ill.

We would not be censorious. We would not lightly estimate the difficulties of the task which was presented. We would not pretend that the invasion might have been entirely prevented, or that the epidemic might, by any available means, have been restrained from serious ravages. But we must regard with amazement and reprobation the apparent apathy and helplessness of the authorities, and also, we regret to say, the indifference—if indifference it was—of the public press. We can understand the reluctance of authorities to do anything which might cause panic or even alarm; and the reluctance of the press of a great city to publish anything

that might deter the coming of visitors, particularly in the busy purchasing season when such abstention would "hurt business." We can even imagine some papers speculating upon the loss of advertising income they would suffer if through their urging the theatres and other places of entertainment were closed. But we cannot help also understanding some considerations immeasurably transcending these and sweeping them into negligible insignificance.

The facts—what Mr. Balfour once called the cubical, concrete, congealed facts—are these: That hundreds of thousands of our soldiers have been incapacitated, at the very crisis of the war; that tens of thousands of lives have been lost; that our military efficiency has been seriously impaired; that industrial and commercial activities have been demoralized; that pecuniary losses amounting probably to hundreds of millions of dollars have been inflicted upon the country, with non-pecuniary losses and woe simply inestimable; and that meantime the spirit of Mr. Micawber has ridden regnant and supreme above the scene.

It has been an exhibition of unreadiness, of ineptitude, of either apathy or cowardice or both, unrivalled in the history of the nation.

DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN

THE significance of the Takashi Hara Cabinet in Japan has passed too little noticed amid the tumult and the shouting of the war. Indeed, the advent of that Cabinet has received little more than perfunctory attention. Yet it is really nothing less than epochal; one of the most important events in the world that have grown indirectly out of the war.

To appreciate its full importance we must look back a number of years, at least to the time, nearly thirty years ago, when the Japanese Constitution was framed and promulgated. In preparation for that august event a number of Japan's ablest statesmen, led by the greatest of them all, Ito, visited the principal countries of the world and studied their constitutional systems and their workings with minute care. The object was, of course, to discover what principles would be best for adoption by Japan, a nation which was about to abandon an almost absolute autocracy for a popular form of government. The results of these travels and studies was

the framing, adoption and promulgation of a constitution modelled pretty closely upon that of Prussia, or at least resembling it more than any other, particularly in the relationship between the Cabinet and the Parliament. That is to say, provision was made for a Cabinet responsible to the Emperor rather than to the representatives of the people.

This was a matter of disappointment to many, who had hoped for parliamentary government as it existed in France and Great Britain. For many years some of the foremost statesmen had been advocating popular government. Indeed, it must be recalled that the very first of the famous Five Articles to which the Emperor swore at the beginning of the Era of Meiji, in 1868, and which have been called the Magna Charta of Japan, provides that

“Deliberative Assemblies shall be established, and all measures of government shall be decided by public opinion.”

Under the Constitution as promulgated in 1890 a national deliberative assembly was indeed established. But with all the nine Ministers of State responsible solely to the Emperor, it was impossible to say that all measures of government were decided by public opinion. Accordingly, just as agitation for a Constitution followed the promulgation of the Five Articles, agitation for a Ministry responsible to Parliament followed the adoption of the Constitution. Ito himself sympathized with that agitation, even though he did not deem it prudent to associate himself openly with it at the beginning. But when in 1900 he formed the Seiyukai Party, no secret was made of the fact that its ultimate object was the establishment of party government with a Ministry directly and solely responsible to Parliament, after the British rather than the Prussian model.

It was then not yet time for the great reform to be accomplished, though from that date forward party influence was increasingly felt, and the Cabinet was more and more regardless of the tone and temper of Parliament. Japan entered the present war, therefore, as an autocratically governed nation. She had a Constitution and a Parliament, but her Ministers were responsible solely to the Emperor and not at all to the people or their representatives. This led, then, to this anomalous state of affairs, that while she was nominally fighting against autocracy and for making the world safe for democracy, Japan was in fact herself an autocracy almost identical with that of Prussia.

It was doubtless this fact that encouraged Germany just before and in the beginning of the war, prior to Japan's entry into it, so persistently to intrigue with Japan for the latter's coöperation on the German side. It was the stupid Hunnish belief that Japan was opposed to democracy that led to the attempts to array Japan against the United States. Germany did not realize that underneath the nominal autocracy there was rapidly growing in Japan a democratic spirit that could not be checked, but which would in a short time dominate the nation and its Government.

The growth of that spirit was materially strengthened and expedited by the war. Early in the present year it had proceeded so far that it was commonly observed that Japan's continuance in the war, and particularly her intervention with the other Powers in Russian affairs, would depend upon the course of the Government in respect to party rule and Ministerial responsibility. It is not too much to say that the strange and apparently inexplicable hesitation of Japan to take that step in intervention for which she was assumed to be eager, was due chiefly if not solely to the insistence of the rising democracy that it should have a voice in government and that the Imperial Ministry should be responsible to Parliament. Assurances to that effect were made and accepted, and the promise has now been practically fulfilled, at least as completely as the people expect it or wish it to be at this time. There is no revision of the Constitution. There is no formal announcement upon the subject. But the fact is recognized on all hands that Japan has now, for the first time in her history, a Cabinet belonging entirely to one political party and organized thus with the express purpose of making the party in question responsible for governmental results and of making the continued existence of the Ministry dependent upon its retaining the support of a party majority in Parliament.

In brief, Japan in this Cabinet change has aligned herself definitely and fully on the side of democracy as against autocracy. Her Constitution remains Prussian in letter, but in spirit it has become liberalized and popularized like those of the other Allies. It remains, of course, to be seen how successful the new Ministry will be in conducting the Government on the new basis, and to what extent the Emperor himself will sanction and coöperate with the change. Nominally the Ministry remains responsible to him alone. But if it

meets with an adverse vote in Parliament on some crucial issue, what will happen? According to the letter of the Constitution it may ignore it and continue in office, if the Emperor so wishes. According to the present intention of the Prime Minister, it will resign in favor of a Ministry that can command a Parliamentary majority. But what if it should meet with an adverse vote and should therefore wish to resign, and the Emperor should ask or direct it to remain in office?

That would undoubtedly be an embarrassing state of affairs. But there is little room for supposing that it will ever occur. It is believed by the best informed that the Emperor himself is in accord with the new order of things, and will henceforth acquiesce in the complete responsibility of his Ministers to Parliament. If so, the constitutional development of Japan will be completed, and she will take her place among the genuine democracies of the world.

REPRISALS A NECESSITY

THE Hun has made reprisals a necessity. He seemed to have done so long ago, in his commission of wrongs for which no adequate atonement ever could be made and for which only vengeance was possible. Reprisals of vengeance were what then seemed inevitable. But now he has again made necessary reprisals of a different kind, reprisals both punitive and compensatory; and he has done this in a most extreme manner and degree in some of his very latest acts of war.

The monstrous ravages which were committed during the German advance into Belgium and France were explicable—not excusable, but explicable—on the ground of frightfulness. They were intended to strike terror into the hearts of the people and their Governments, and literally frighten them into submission. In that they failed, but that was their intent. So we may say that much of the destruction committed since has had a military object, or has been done through assumed military necessity. That excuse was made even for the destruction of the Rheims cathedral. That was a lie, of course. But that was the pretext.

The ravages recently committed, however, in the retreat from Belgium and France, can have no such pretext. Not even a Hun would have the impudence to offer it. They served no military purpose or necessity. They did not facili-

tate the flight of the Germans, nor impede the advance of the Allies. The dwellings and churches wantonly destroyed, the orchards cut down, the factories looted and wrecked, are simply tokens of savage spite.

Now, tremendous as the provocation is, we would not counsel reprisals exactly in kind. Yet there is an obvious method of reprisals which would at once inflict great loss upon the Germans and repair in great measure the injuries which they have inflicted upon the Belgians and French.

From the beginning of the war an obvious purpose of Germany has been to destroy those industries of Belgium and France which were rivals of her own. With that aim the factories and workshops of those countries have been systematically looted. All the machinery and tools that could be removed have been stolen and carried away to Germany, while all that could not be removed has been destroyed. The result is that the industries of Belgium and France will be seriously handicapped for years after the war, unless compensatory reprisals are made.

We hold, therefore, that an essential condition of peace should be not only that Germany should so far as possible return what she has stolen, but also that from Germany's own industries there should be taken equipment to make good the losses which Belgium and France have suffered. In Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia, adjacent to the Belgian frontier, are clustered some of the greatest industrial centres of Germany—Essen and Crefeld and Elberfeld and Duisburg and the rest. It would not be vandalism, it would be justice, for the Allies to take possession of them, not wantonly to destroy them, but to strip them of all movable equipment for transportation into France and Belgium, to replace what the Germans there stole and destroyed.

So would we deal with the fleets of Germany, which for four years have lain secure in inland waters. They should be taken from her, to replace those of the Allies and the neutral powers which have been destroyed by German U-boats. A ship for a ship, and a factory for a factory, should be the inexorable rule. That would throw the losses of the war upon those who caused them and who sought to inflict them upon others. It would be the reprisals of justice and restoration, not of mere vengeance and destruction.